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Introduction
Ten years ago, genetic engineering was limited to cutting and
pasting DNA from existing organisms. Today’s biologists can
write down gene sequences that have never existed anywhere,
place an order over the Internet, and receive the desired DNA
by return mail. The newscience of synthetic biologydreamsof
a day when blueprints for new life forms can be designed as
easily as computer chips. Practitioners argue that the key is to
create libraries of standard gene sequences (‘parts’) that
reliably perform simple functions like encoding an enzyme or
building a protein that detects light. This strategyis potentially
powerful: the electronics industry already uses similar
libraries to create ultra-complex objects like computer chips
and software (Endy, 2005).
The technological beneﬁts of introducing electronic methods
into biology seem clear. The economic consequences are more
ambiguous. Many electronics and software industries feature
a dangerous ‘winner-take-all’ or ‘tipping’ dynamic, in which
an initial frontrunner becomes steadily more entrenched
over time. Microsoft’s rise to power is an obvious example.
Signiﬁcantly, tipping dynamics do not always lead to mono-
poly. In fact, many outcomes are possible: The eventual
winner can be open (Apache) or proprietary (Windows),
technically superior (Web) or suboptimal (VHS). Historically,
these outcomes have emerged more or less at random from
rough-and-tumble contests in the market. Synthetic biologists
can and should do better. Which of the many possible
outcomes is most likely to deliver a world of plentiful, high
quality, and affordable parts?
Now is surely the time to ask. Academic scientists still
control the lion’s share of synthetic biology projects,
resources,andexpertise.Potentially,thisgivesthemimportant
leverage over how industry evolves. But that will change. One
company (Amyris Technologies, see below) is already using
synthetic biology to make a parts-based organism. Other
companies will surely follow, dwarﬁng the academic sector
and eroding its capacity to inﬂuence events. At the same time,
any action must be carefully planned. Despite similarities to
earlier technologies (e.g. classical biotechnology, electronics),
synthetic biology is sufﬁciently unique that interventions
based on casual analogies are doomed to fail or, worse,
produce unintended consequences. Responsible action must
proceedfromadeeperandmoreexplicitunderstandingofhow
standardized parts will change biotechnology. The natural
language for this inquiry is economics.
The tipping dynamic
Comparedto electronics,biology researchhas so fardone little
to exploit the power of shared, standardized components.
However, that is changing. There is already intriguing
evidence that companies trying to turn stem cells into, for
example, heart or nerve tissue, prefer to start from a small
number of standard lines for which they have shared
experience (Maurer, 2007). This dynamic is very similar to
the electronics industry, where competing companies routi-
nely write programs for a common operating system or game
console. We expect such examples to proliferate as biologists’
ability to design and manipulate living things expands.
Nowhere is this ambition to standardize more pronounced
than in synthetic biology. For now, no one can be sure that the
parts agenda will succeed. However, we have already noted
that at least one company—Amyris Biotechnology—is betting
on success (Ro et al, 2006). According to recent reports
(Keasling, 2007), Amyris has already made dramatic progress
in making several dozen parts work together inside yeast and
bacteria to synthesize the drug precursor artemisinin. Future
projects will include rearranging many of the same parts into
yeast- or bacteria-based factories for making aromatics and
perfumes. These projects should become steadily cheaper as
Amyrisgainsexperiencebyusingthesamepartsoverandover
again. At least for now, the standard parts idea seems to be
paying off.
Given these developments, it is only prudent to think about
the economics of an industry in which the parts agenda
triumphs. (Of course, the agenda could also fail, but in that
case there will be no policy issues to worry abouty)
Signiﬁcantly, such an industry must have certain basic
characteristics. First, parts will be reused. After all, the parts
agenda is pointless if every inventor starts from scratch.
Second, assembling standard parts into new organisms will be
expensive. Some idea of these costs can be judged from
Amyris’ artemisinin project. The 5-year, $20 million experi-
ment reportedly spends 95% of its time trying to ﬁnd and ﬁx
unintended interactions between parts (Keasling, 2007).
Third, we expect the cost of using parts to fall each time they
are reused, particularly where successive experiments focus
on the same metabolic pathways. Based on today’s limited
evidence, knowledgeable observers think that total project
costs could fall by 25% or more the ﬁrst time parts are reused,
and that subsequent reuse will likely cut costs several more
times before savings ﬂatten (Keasling, 2006).
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can be neatly summarized by a single statement: ‘The average
cost of using a part will decline steeply the more it is used.’
Industries that exhibit this feature have been extensively
studied since the 1990s and are now well understood. They
exhibit what economists call ‘network effects’: the more users
a product has, the more attractive it becomes. Network effects
explain the electronics industry’s notorious winner-take-all
dynamics and, especially, the rise of dominant ﬁrms like
Microsoft and eBay.
It is easy to see how similar network effects would arise in
synthetic biology: suppose that Parts ‘A’ and ‘B’ perform the
same function but that Part A has been used in one more
experiment than Part B. Then according to our assumptions,
Part A could be 25% cheaper to use than Part B. This makes it
much more likely that users will select Part A for future
experiments (provided they share in the experiences made by
the earlier users of Part A) and generates a ‘rich-get-richer’
dynamic, in which even small differences in initial popularity
are rapidly ampliﬁed. Indeed, this dynamic works even if Part
A is a commercial product and Part B costs nothing. All that is
required is for Part A’s owner to set prices lower than Part A’s
cost advantage over Part B.
The fact that different parts must be used together also gives
actors a strong incentive to create entire libraries of parts, in
much the sameway that software companies develop multiple
programs to cover a range of applications. Suppose that
CompanyY owns70%ofthemostpopularpartsandCompany
Z owns the remaining 30%.Then, Company Y can get 100% of
thebusinessbyofferingacompletesuiteofwhateverpartsthat
the users need, that is, turning the contest into a competition
between libraries instead of individual parts. This can be done
by refusing to license parts individually or by offering volume
discounts. In theory, courts might strike such practices down
under the antitrust laws (LePage’s, 2003). But even if they did,
companies would still want to develop competing libraries. As
the French economist Augustin Cournot (1838 (NT Bacon,
trans.1897))ﬁrstpointedout,twomonopolistswhosellgoods
that must be used (if at all) together routinely earn less proﬁt
than a single monopolist who sells both products. Knowing
this, patent owners would prefer to offer a complete library of
parts.
Corporate strategy
If and when Amyris succeeds, new companies are bound to
enter the market. How will these entrants view the tipping
dynamics described above? Basically, there are two possi-
bilities. First, particularly aggressive and well-placed compa-
nies will aspireto become the industry’s parts monopolist. But
second, other companies will fear monopolization and do
what they can to avoid it.
In the software industry, Linux is an example of how this
second group can triumph over the ﬁrst. It turns out that
software modules—like parts—seldom, if ever, work the ﬁrst
time they are assembled. Indeed, testing, debugging,
and maintenance reportedly account for fourth-ﬁfths of all
software development costs. This means that mass market
software companies like Microsoft cannot afford to offer more
than a few permutations of their modules to the public.
Conversely, companies that want novel conﬁgurations must
hire programmers to do the work (Bessen, 2005). But why
should these programmers buy high-priced commercial
modules at all? In the 1990s, many of these programmers
realized that it would be cheaper to write their own modules.
Forthem,workingonLinuxmeant‘creatingcodethattheywill
never have to pay someone to use again’ (O’Mahoney, 2003).
Like programmers, synthetic biology companies do not
want to split their earnings with a parts monopolist. This
should give them a powerful reason to donate workers and
resourcestoaLinux-style‘open parts’collaboration.However,
the Linux model is only viable in certain circumstances. To the
extent that commercial contributors’ reward is limited to their
own use of the product, they may decide that developing
expensive or little used parts is a bad investment. In this case,
relying on ‘own use’ incentives might be a show-stopper for
synthetic biology. Synthetic biologists often complain that
existing parts are both unsophisticated and in short supply.
This observation suggests that own use rewards are insufﬁ-
cient. Ultimately, this is an empirical question. Nevertheless,it
is important to recognize that a simple Linux model based on
own use incentives might not meet synthetic biology’s parts
needs.
Where, then, would the extra reward come from? Absent
government or foundation funding, the answer, plainly, is
‘other parts users.’ This, of course, is what patents are
supposed to do. However, patents often compound the
tendency of network markets to tip into monopoly, technically
inferior products and other pitfalls. A much better solution
would be to meter protection so that it lasted just long enough
to supply the part-maker’s (otherwise missing) reward and
then disappeared. While this may sound fanciful, detailed
study by one of us (J Henkel) has shown that such systems
actually exist. Software ﬁrms that write code for ‘embedded
Linux’usuallyselltheirservicestoahandfulofcompaniesthat
make, say, DVD players or machine tools. However, the Linux
General Public License (‘GPL’) does not require them to
disclose their code to the general public until devices contain-
ing it have reached a mass market. This creates an 18-month
window in which the code remains proprietary. Surprisingly,
this short protection period seems to provide adequate
incentives—if it did not, innovation would have stopped by
now. Indeed, the average protection period is even shorter.
This is because companies voluntarily reveal about 50% of
their code before GPL requires them to (Henkel, 2006). Better
still, the business models that drive this behavior are not
speciﬁctosoftwareandoughttoworkinsyntheticbiology(see
Box 1).
Making a policy choice
So far we have argued that synthetic biology companies have
dollars-and-cents reasons to design parts that are either open
or—as in embedded Linux—become open after some short
period of time. The fact that something is feasible does not,
however, make it desirable. Do we want open source parts at
all? Too often, this debate has been framed in terms of vague,
ad hoc analogies (‘parts are like operating systemsy’) or else
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forms’) that are beyond reason and evidence. Here, we focus
on a narrow and well-deﬁned question: What mix of patent
and open source incentives is most likely to deliver the cheap
and abundant parts that synthetic biologists (and, by implica-
tion, the world) needs? (Box 2)
In modern innovation economics, this turns out to be a two-
part question. First,‘static efﬁciency’suggests that, once a part
exists, its blueprint should be freely available to everyone.
Patents do poorly on this ground because they let inventors
charge high prices for inventions. On the other hand,‘dynamic
efﬁciency’ suggests that inventors need incentives to create
parts in the ﬁrst place. This often means letting them extract
proﬁts from users. Patents handle this problem very naturally
(Scotchmer, 2004). These arguments lead to the following
observation: if open source incentives can produce a given
part, then society is better off without patents. But if not, it is
still better for a society to have an expensive, patented part
than no part at all. Given our limited knowledge of the world,
we cannot write down (or at least cannot prove!) a clear rule,
which speciﬁes parts that should be patented and those that
should be open. Moreover, even if we could, the patent laws
would not allow us implement it.
We can, however, do the next best thing. Writing down an
explicit rule may not be necessary if we can create incentives
that encourage companies to make the right decision on their
own. We have already said that open source is desirable,
except where patents are needed to elicit parts production. It
follows that society is better off whenever a company creates a
part and then voluntarily participates in open development
instead of patenting. The trick, of course, is to design
institutions that encourage such decisions. The institutions
that made embedded Linux work were, in some sense, an
accident. Can synthetic biologists foster them intentionally?
Steering toward open source
For the community to exert inﬂuence, it must ﬁrst control
something that companies want. Fortunately, it has such an
asset. We have stressed that a part’s value increases each time
it is used. But experience means nothing unless it has been
captured and stored. Today, most of the world’s parts data is
found in the community’sRegistryofStandardBiologicalParts
(http://parts.mit.edu). Synthetic biology companies will
certainly clamor for these data. But what should the rules be?
Box 1 Open source and the bottom line
Companies in the embedded Linux industry use many business strategies to capture value. Synthetic biology companies can exploit most of them:
Open parts, patented products. Software vendors often share basic parts and modules, while protecting the products made from them. Synthetic
biology companies could similarly share parts while patenting completed organisms. Companies that create organisms for individual clients may not need
patent protection at all.
Shared development. Software vendors routinely share code, hoping that others will update it, identify and ﬁx bugs, or write extensions. Synthetic
biology companies could similarly learn from users and even competitors.
Establishing a user base. Software vendors rely on open source to attract users. Synthetic biology companies similarly want to see their parts used as
early and as often as possible.
Other strategies. Software vendors participate in open source to demonstrate technical prowess to would-be clients, learn new product ideas,
demonstrate social responsibility, and hire talented programmers. Similar motives should also operate in synthetic biology.
Synthetic biology contains almost all of the same ingredients that make embedded Linux successful. First, synthetic biology’s parts approach emphasizes
strong modularity. This allows the work of creating a parts library to be spread over manycompanies. Italso makes it possible for companies to earn proﬁts by
patenting some parts while making others openly available. Second, we expect companies to have fairly idiosyncratic parts needs. This means that they
cannot simply ‘free ride’ by waiting for others to make what they need. It also suggests that companies can often share parts without losing their technological
‘edge’ to competitors. Third, different companies will have different expertise. This suggests that community-based libraries will often outperform company
ones.Finally,thesyntheticbiologymarketwillprobablyincludelargenumbersofsmall,idiosyncraticcustomers.Thismakespatentlicensinglesslucrativeand,
by comparison, openness more attractive.
Box 2 Are life sciences companies ready for open source?
Economic incentives are relentless. If open source makes money, companies will adopt it sooner or later. That said, progress will be faster if industry is open-
minded. Recent events suggest that life sciences companies already understand openness and do not hesitate to use it as a business tactic. Such practices
date back to 1999, when 10 pharmaceutical companies funded the SNP Consortium to put genome data in the public domain so that their competitors could
not obtain patents to corner the market. [1] More recent examples include Pﬁzer’s decision to disclose the contents of its drug discovery pipeline [2],
Syngenta’s decision to share its rice genome data [3], and Novartis’ decision to release their genome-wide type 2 diabetes map over the Web. [4] So far, this
sharing has been largely limited to releases of basic data. At least arguably, parts are closer to a working product, and to that extent would require at least a
small leap of imagination. That, however, is what smart businessmen are supposed to do.
[1] Janet Hope, Open Source Biotechnology (December 2004) (unpublished PhD dissertation, Australian National University), available at http://
opensource.mit.edu/papers/hope.pdf.
[2] Anon, ‘Pﬁzer Pipeline as of December 20, 2006’ available at http://www.pﬁzer.com/pﬁzer/help/download/product_pipeline_view.pdf.
[3] Dennis Normile, ‘Syngenta Agrees to Wider Release,’ Science 296: 1785 (2002).
[4] http://www.novartis.com/newsroom/news/index.shtml (item for Feb. 12 2007).
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issues of legal implementation). The ﬁrst—and simplest—is to
make the data available to anyone for any purpose. Today’s
Registry does this. Interestingly, even this very minimal
intervention makes openness signiﬁcantly more likely. Recent
economics research shows that companies can often earn
more money by pooling information instead of hoarding it
(Allen, 1983; Nuvolari, 2004). By capturing other users’
experience, the Registry would enhance the beneﬁts of
pooling.
A second optionwould be to limit the Registry to open parts.
This would reward companies each time they donated a
particular part to the public domain. This is basically the
embedded Linux model.
Finally, the community could open the Registry to any
owner that promised to donate its parts to the public domain
after some ﬁxed number of years or, perhaps, royalty
payments. This is probably the best option, since companies
could always make a business decision to donate their parts
early (our second option) if conditions warranted. The main
practical problem would be to decide how many years to ask
for: too few and partsmakers will stay out of the Registry, too
many and the beneﬁts of openness are deferred. One way to
avoid these dangers would be to select a conservative number
(say, 5 years) and then adjust it downward, based on the
number and quality of parts ﬂowing into the Registry.
So far, we have assumed that the Registry will retain its
status as the world’s premier focal point for recording and
sharing parts information. This seems reasonable, since
scientiﬁc databases—like parts—almost always follow a
winner-take-all dynamic in which early frontrunners become
larger and more entrenched over time. On the other hand,
would-be parts monopolists might try to build their own
proprietary databases to challenge the Registry. We think this
risk is manageable. For every company that wanted to
monopolize parts data, there would be several others trying
to block it. The Registry would almost certainly receive their
support.
Conclusion
The ongoing debate between open source advocates and
patent enthusiasts is entertaining but also paralyzing. For
reasons explained above, we cannot say that open source is
‘always’ better than patents or vice versa. Indeed, such
statementsarealmostsurelywrong.Suggestionsthatsynthetic
biologists should combine an open ‘operating system’ layer
with a proprietary ‘applications’ layer are shrewder, but
assume that such lines can be drawn in advance. This, too,
is a dead end. Discussions that do not lead to action are
pointless.
We do not claim that the embedded Linux-type system
outlined above would produce an ‘ideal’ or ‘optimal’ result.
That can almost never be done in economics. What we do
claim is that our scheme is feasible, represents an unambig-
uous improvement compared to either patents or open source
in isolation, and is likely to yield substantial results. It is, in
short, worth doing.
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